Pragmatic complexity:a new foundation for moving beyond ‘evidence-based policy making? by Ansell, Christopher & Geyer, Robert Ralph
1 
 
‘Pragmatic complexity’ a new foundation for moving beyond ‘evidence-based policy making’? 
 
Professor Chris Ansell 
Professor Robert Geyer 
 
Introduction 
Despite a plethora of academic criticism for the past few decades, the realm of policy still remains 
dominated by the rational, positivist and quantitative approaches of New Public Management 
(NPM), ‘evidence-based’ approaches (EBPM) and target/accountancy oriented ‘scientific’ 
management. These approaches tend to have a top-down, centralising and hierarchical tendency in 
relation to policy actors and stakeholders and often imply a much greater degree of certainty and 
knowledge than is realistic within most policy situations. This dominance (despite its weaknesses) 
rests on its ‘scientific’ foundation, perceived utility and lack of an acceptable and practical 
alternative framework. Two notable attempts to develop an alternative to this dominant framework, 
however, have come from the older tradition of American pragmatism and the newer approach of 
complexity. We propose to bring them together to provide a positive alternative to these modernist 
ideas, one that conditions but does not reject the value of scientific rationality.  
In this article, we will focus our attention on EBPM, whose star is still on the rise. Evidence-based 
policy making is an extension of the movement for “evidence-based medicine” (EBM), which 
predated it and sought to harness hospital and physician decision-making more tightly to scientific 
evidence. By the late 1990s, the idea of EBPM began to be extended from clinical medicine to 
policymaking in general. A key impetus came from the UK Labour Government, which adopted 
evidence-based policymaking as a core framework for evaluating policy ideas. While social scientific 
knowledge about policy has never been absent from policymaking, what was distinct about this 
movement was the breadth and primacy given to the role of knowledge in setting and implementing 
policy.  Many critiques of evidence-based policymaking followed. Parsons (2002) argued that EBPM 
assumes a managerial and mechanistic model of policymaking that depoliticizes knowledge and 
ignores uncertainty and public values. Sanderson (2002) observed that EBPM underestimates the 
challenges of establishing causality in order to determine “what works.” Greenhalgh and Russell 
(2009) argued that EBPM downplays how policymaking fundamentally requires democratic 
deliberation about values. 
The theoretical challenge of this critique is how to avoid throwing the baby out with the bath water.   
Clearly scientific knowledge is valued in policymaking and can have great legitimacy with citizens.   
Many of the critics are not arguing against the value of scientific knowledge per se, but against the 
way it is harnessed to a model of top-down rational policymaking. We argue that a marriage of 
pragmatism and complexity theory can provide a positive alternative conception of the relationship 
between scientific knowledge and decision-making.  Both acknowledge the value of knowledge, 
while appreciating its limits. While pragmatism offers a way to integrate science together with 
democratic deliberation and values, complexity theory offers an alternative conception of science 
appropriate for policy process. 
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In this article we will introduce some of the core concepts of pragmatist philosophy and complexity 
theory relating to policy making and governance and position ourselves relative to the broad sweep 
of both perspectives. Then, we will examine the implications of ‘pragmatic complexity’ for EBPM and 
briefly explore drug policy as a case study of how pragmatic complexity might be applicable and 
conclude with a short discussion of the potential for pragmatic complexity to function as a new 
framework of public policy. 
 
 
What do we mean by pragmatist philosophy? 
 
Pragmatism developed as a distinct philosophy and political perspective in the 19th century U.S., 
though in constant interchange with European philosophical traditions and political developments 
(Menand 2001; West 1989). On a philosophical level, the first generation of Pragmatist 
philosophers—notably, Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead—
took up the task of breaking down the dualisms they saw as plaguing Cartesian and Kantian 
philosophical traditions. In response, they developed a practical, experiential philosophical 
perspective that emphasized the dynamic process of individual and societal development.  
 
Beginning in the 1970’s, a number of intellectual and political developments came together that 
eventually led to a major revival of Pragmatism. Inspired by the linguistic turn in philosophy, the 
post-analytical American philosopher Richard Rorty wrote Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
(1981)—a spirited attack on the conception of philosophy as the bedrock of all knowledge. Rorty 
counter posed this conception of philosophy with John Dewey’s appreciation of philosophy as a 
practical enterprise that rejected “the quest for certainty.” In Between Objectivism and Relativism 
(1983), American philosopher Richard Bernstein wrote approvingly of the philosophical turn towards 
more practical notions of rationality and highlighted important pragmatist contributions to the 
understanding of practical rationality. Similarly, Donald Schön’s The Reflective Practitioner: How 
Professionals Think in Action (1983) built on Dewey’s model of inquiry to demonstrate how different 
professions used experience, reflection, and improvisation to solve problems. Finally, building in part 
on George Herbert Mead’s understanding of the role of communication in social development, 
German philosopher Jürgen Habermas published A Theory of Communicative Action (1989), sparking 
an interest in “deliberative” forms of democracy. 
 
Pragmatism is not an easy philosophy to summarize in a few short sentences. The interests of the 
early pragmatists ranged across logic, semiotics, aesthetics, psychology, learning, social theory, and 
political theory, and contemporary pragmatists have equally broad interests. A common theme 
running through pragmatism is a dynamic conception of human development that can be referred to 
as “evolutionary learning” (Ansell 2011). Pragmatists emphasize that learning is an on-going process 
of problem-solving, deliberation, experimentation, sedimented over time as experience, identity, 
habit, skill, and knowledge. Knight and Johnson (1999) have argued that pragmatism is compatible 
with a rational choice conception of action and they are correct in the sense that both stress that 
actors are purposive and both are concerned about the consequences of action. However, a 
pragmatist conception of action diverges from rational choice by emphasizing that 1) much of 
behavior is habitual, reflecting sedimented experience and learned skills; 2) that values arise in the 
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process of problem-solving and are often incommensurable; 3) that actors confront specific 
contextual challenges creatively, often using imagination to rehearse possible courses of action; 4) 
that communication is central not only for social coordination, but also in the constitution of 
identity; 5) that emotion is intertwined (often positively) with cognition; and 6) that means and ends 
continuously influence each other (Whitford 2002; Beckert 2003; Cohen 2007; Hodgson 2010). 
Taken together, this attention to learning, problem-solving, habit, experience, skill, creativity, 
communication, and iterative action represent a distinctive conception of practical rationality.  
 
Pragmatism uses a ‘both/and’ approach to empirical or normative perspectives and the fact/value 
dichotomy. For example, with respect to learning, pragmatism may be read as saying “learning is 
good” (normative) or “be attentive to the way that much behavior is learned” (empirical).  In any 
case, pragmatism’s anti-foundationalism and its naturalization of ethics lead it to be more concerned 
about the process of ethical action than its philosophical first principles. Even where pragmatism is 
being normative, it tends to shift attention from the “context of justification” to the “context of 
discovery” (Caspary 2000). Yet Pragmatism does not preach an opportunistic “whatever works” view 
of the world, as sometimes accused. It is vitally interested in human values and a Pragmatist ethics 
has been advanced for several policy-related fields—environmental ethics (Pearson, 2014), bioethics 
(Pamental 2013) and science and technology ethics (Keulartz et al. 2004). 
 
A number of authors have noted how pragmatism helps us address the challenges of incorporating 
knowledge into policymaking. In the field of health psychology, for instance, Cornish and Gillespie 
(2009) argue that the attraction of Pragmatism is that it is pluralist with respect to knowledge, but at 
the same time non-relativist (However, for a recent debate about pragmatism and pluralism, see 
Talisse and Aikin 2005).  Thus, it is able to appreciate different kinds of knowledge, while viewing this 
knowledge as warranted by different uses, purposes, and contexts.  Thus, randomized controlled 
trials are understood to be useful for certain purposes, but not the “the gold standard” of a 
hierarchy of knowledge.   Other types of knowledge—including practitioner’s qualitative 
knowledge—may be equally valid or useful for other purposes and contexts.   Because of this respect 
for different kinds of knowledge, Pragmatism has been regarded as providing a philosophical 
foundation for “mixed method” evaluation (Maxcy 2003; Hall 2013). 
 
Popa et al. (2015) argue that pragmatism provides a model for integrating different types of 
knowledge together to address challenging sustainability problems—an idea known as 
“transdisciplinarity” in the field of sustainability research.  They argue that sustainability problems 
are “characterized by uncertainty, instability, uniqueness and value conflict” and therefore they “do 
not fit the prevalent model of technical-instrumental rationality” (2014, 47).  Under such conditions, 
transdisciplinarity can avail itself of a pragmatist conception of reflexivity, which they define as 
“open-ended processes of inquiry geared towards a broadening of the community of practice 
through social innovation and experimentation” (2014, 48).    This conception of reflexivity moves 
away from the “reductionist model of positivism” and instead conceives of research as a “socially-
mediated process of problem-solving based on experimentation, learning and context specificity” 
(2014, 48). 
 
In a critique of the evidence-based movement in education, Biesta (2007) advances a similar 
argument, suggesting that a fundamental problem with this movement is that it assumes a clear 
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technical separation between ends and means.   Such an assumption is unwarranted in the field of 
education, which is an “open and recursive system” and a “process of symbolic or symbolically 
mediated interaction” (2007, 8; author’s emphasis).  As such, education requires on-going and 
adaptive value judgments.  He argues that Dewey’s ideas about the continuous interaction of ends 
and means and the idea that ends—as well as means—are subject in inquiry and revision are better 
suited to the domain of education.   Moreover, he argues that for Dewey, evidence would not be 
regarded as “rules of action,” but rather as “hypotheses of intelligent problem solving” (2007, 17).   
A similar of saying this is that evidence can be treated as heuristic as opposed to algorithmic (van 
Aken 2005). 
 
Thus, pragmatism contextualizes, but does not abandon the goal of collecting and using of 
knowledge.  It is sensitive to the need to bring different types of knowledge together and reflexive 
about the values inherent in knowledge production.  To deepen this analysis, we can further explore 
how pragmatism orients us to three fundamental questions about any public policy situation: What 
is problematic? What values are at stake? And what is possible?  These questions lead to 
appreciation of three corresponding dimensions of the policy process: problem-setting, deliberation, 
and experimentation.  
 
What is Problematic? 
 
Whether as a normative lens or an empirical perspective, pragmatism encourages us to orient 
ourselves to the concrete situations in which policy issues arise, focusing in particular on the 
opportunities or demands for action entailed by these situations. For example, a pragmatist 
conception of democracy opposes ideal conceptions of democracy by taking the world as it is and 
focusing on the concrete challenges it presents (Fung 2012).  The focus on the concrete situation 
orients us to the embeddedness of individuals and groups in historically specific webs of activity and 
focuses on the problems that arise in the course of this activity.  
  
For a pragmatist, problems are themselves problematic. The precise contours, definition and full 
meaning of a problem are often uncertain and contested, prompting inquiry into the problem and 
deliberation about what it means and how to solve it. Thus, problem-solving is a skilled and creative 
endeavor, which means that individuals and groups will vary in their capacity to address problems. 
Because problems trigger reflexivity and are opportunities for learning and growth, and because 
they are problematic, a pragmatist approach to public policy is vitally interested in the problem-
solving strategies adopted by individuals and groups (Ansell 2011). 
  
If problems are themselves problematic, the first step in any problem-solving process is problem-
setting or problem definition.   Schön makes the point clearly: 
 
When ends are fixed and clear, then the decision to act can present itself as an instrumental 
problem.   But when ends are confused and conflicting, there is as yet no ‘problem’ to solve.  
A conflict of ends cannot be resolved by techniques derived from applied research. It is 
rather through the non-technical process of framing the problematic situation that we may 
organize and clarify both the ends to be achieved and the possible means of achieving them 




Pragmatism, however, does not consider problem definition a neat and compartmentalized stage 
that simply precedes the more important business of problem solving, particularly under complex 
and uncertain conditions.  The definition of the problem is provisional and must be revisited in the 
face of feedback from attempts to solve the problem.  Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock’s (2013) 
discussion of problem driven iterative adaptation as a strategy for dealing for development 
programs provides a good example of how the interaction of problem-setting and problem-solving 
can work in practice. 
  
  
What Values are at Stake? 
 
Pragmatism’s focus on problem-solving is often read as a narrow instrumentalism. But a wider 
reading demonstrates a more humanistic concern with the source and fate of values (Selznick 2008).  
Pragmatism encourages us to see values as contextual and valuation as a process, as opposed to 
understanding them as objective qualities of things or as embodied in fixed moral rules (Stuhr 2003; 
Klamer 2003; Stark 2011). Furthermore, by shifting away from a “spectator model of knowledge” 
towards a more practical conception of knowledge, pragmatism rejects the notion that knowledge 
can be value-neutral.  Knowledge must therefore be assessed in terms of “whose problems” are 
being addressed.  Yet because valuation is a contextual and processual and because knowledge is 
fallible and provisional, the articulation of the relationship between knowledge and values is at least 
partially emergent and constructed rather than fixed and transcendent.   This stance towards the 
relationship between knowledge and values leads pragmatism to stress a collaborative process of 
communication and deliberation in surfacing, understanding, and negotiating values (Ansell 2016).   
   
A distinctive feature of the pragmatist model of deliberation is that it is linked to inquiry (Bowman 
2004). Inquiry involves the “elucidation of meaning” (Festenstein 2001, p.734) and requires self-
reflection on one’s own beliefs, interests, and values. pragmatist inquiry does not somehow 
magically dissolve political conflict, but rather helps to illuminate and deepen our understanding of 
our own and others’ beliefs, values, and interests (Evans 2000; Atkins, Hassan and Dunn 2007). 
Deliberation and community create one another. As Cohen notes, deliberation does not merely 
bridge between the gaps in human minds, it is also an activity that “constitutes” individuals and 
communities (Cohen 2012, p.147).  This conception of deliberation has encouraged democratic 
theorists and governance scholars to investigate “publics” (Fung 2002, 2003; Goodin and Dryzek 
2006) where they have found that deliberation allows groups to ”emancipate” themselves to some 
degree from ”symbolic politics,” opening up these publics to a wider discussion of issues. For the 
‘critical pragmatist’ John Forester, knowledge claims are not only fallible (the conventional 
pragmatist stance) but also systematically represent power relations (Forester 2013).  
 
One implication of Pragmatism’s concern for reflexively surfacing and deliberating about values is 
that it is often problematic to sharply separate deliberation about values and production of 
knowledge (see also Parsons 2002).  Davoudi (2006) describes the development of an evidence-
based approach to waste management in the UK that sought to keep technical issues separate from 
larger political concerns. He observes that “[t]he cost of this insistence on keeping the process 
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apparently free from political controversies was the loss of legitimacy and political support for the 
outcome” (2006, 687).  
 
What is Possible? 
 
After focusing on what is problematic and inquiring into the values at stake, pragmatism asks what 
can be done to advance the situation. This focus on what is possible is sometimes described as 
meliorism—a belief that the world can be improved by human effort. However, there is more to it 
than moral optimism. The “possible” draws together past, present, and future. Asking “what is 
possible?” inflects the problem with an orientation toward the future. What can be done in the 
present situation, given what we bring from the past, to productively move us in to the future? This 
problem-solving triangulation between past, present, and future leads to at least three important 
consequences for governance and policy making—an emphasis on the creativity of action, a focus on 
the value of experimentation, and an active search for governance forms that improve the quality of 
public policies and democratic governance.  
 
Experimentation is an important pragmatist motif reflecting an acknowledgement of the 
fundamental uncertainty of the world, an emphasis on learning-by-doing, and an openness to 
creative discovery. However, its conception of experimentation calls for the development and use of 
a range of experimental tools that go beyond randomized controlled trials (Ansell 2012; Ansell and 
Bartenberger forthcoming). For example, it might embrace concepts of experimentation connected 
with “design experiments,” (Stoker and Johns 2009), “adaptive governance” (Brunner 2010) and 




What do we mean by complexity? 
 
Complexity, a general term covering a wide range of complex, adaptive, emergent systems and 
phenomena, has grown rapidly since the 1970s (Coveney and Highfield 1995; Mainzer 1997). 
Institutionally, there are now a wide variety of complexity centres and institutes around the world 
and a growing list of MOOC (Massive Open Online Courses) on various aspects of complexity. Since 
the 1990s, it has established footholds in all of the major areas of social science. A few of the more 
recent examples include: in philosophy, sociology and social theory (Byrne and Callaghan 2013; 
Castellani and Hafferty 2009; Smith and Jenks 2006), in politics and general public policy (Colander 
and Kupers 2014; Geyer and Rihani 2010; Geyer and Cairney 2015; Morçöl 2012; Room 2011), in 
management and economics (Arthur 2014; Beinhocker 2005; Stacey 2012) and in international 
relations (Clemens 2013; Harrison 2006; Root 2013). There is also a wide range of works in particular 
policy areas including: Blackman (2006) in social policy, Davis and Sumara (2006) and Trueit (2012) in 
education policy, Kernick (2004), Sweeney (2006) and Sturmberg and Martin (2014) in health policy 
to name just a few. Since the early 2000s a range of new journals have also emerged. Some of those 
that focus on policy include: Emergence: Complexity and Organization, Journal of Policy and Complex 
Systems, and Complexity, Governance and Networks. Even governments and international 
organisations are beginning to support complexity-based research programmes and approaches see: 
OECD Global Science Forum ‘Applications of Complexity Science for Public Policy’ (2009), UK Munro 
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Review (2011) and Australian Government ‘Tackling Wicked Problems Report’ (2007). In a recent 
article, L. Douglas Kiel (2014) argued that complexity theory has already gone through an 
‘emergence’, ‘convergence’ and ‘proliferance’ phase and now expects to see a final ‘divergence’ 
phase develop. Clearly, complexity has come a long way. 
 
In a field with such interdisciplinary and paradigmatic potential there are multiple debates over the 
breadth, definition and implications of complexity. Richardson and Cilliers (2001) divided the field 
into three main schools: reductionist complexity science, soft complexity science, and complexity 
thinking. For Morin (2008) there is just one central division within the field of complexity between 
more ‘restricted’ and ‘general’ interpretations. This is similar to Byrne’s (2005) division between 
‘simple’ and ‘complex’ complexity. The restricted form is based in the mathematical, physical and 
computer sciences and is focused on the creation of a number of computer based quantitative 
methodological tools (agent-based and network modelling in particular). On the other hand, general 
complexity for Morin required an ‘epistemological rethinking’ and a much more substantial 
paradigmatic challenge to the reductionism, determinism, simplification, causality and linearity of 
the traditional scientific perspective. For Morin, with the development of concepts like irreversibility, 
chaos, emergence and self-organisation, complexity could not be reduced to a restricted array of 
methods and fields, but reshaped the entire meaning and endeavour of science and public policy. 
Our approach to complexity is positioned within Richardson and Cilliers’ complexity thinking school, 
Morin’s ‘general’ complexity interpretation and Byrne’s ‘complex’ complexity approach. In this 
tradition, complexity: 
is about systems whose internal structure are not reducible to a mechanical system. In 
particular, it is about connected complex systems, for which the assumptions of average 
types and average interactions are not appropriate and are not made. Such systems 
coevolve with their environment, being “open” to flows of energy, matter, and information 
across whatever boundaries we have chosen to define. These flows do not obey simple, 
fixed laws, but instead result from the internal “sense making” going on inside them, as 
experience, conjectures and experiments are used to modify the interpretive frameworks 
within. (Allen 2001, pp. 39-40). 
From this perspective, complexity theory argues, at the meta-theoretical level, that physical and 
social reality is composed of a wide range of interacting orderly, complex and disorderly 
phenomena. One can focus on different aspects: orderly (gravity or basic aspects of existence: 
life/death), complex (species evolution or institutional development) or disorderly (random chance 
or irrationality), but that does not mean that the others do not exist. Consequently, complexity 
theory argues against “hard” modernism and postmodernism while at the same time as acting as a 
bridge between the two. In this sense it can appear to be both ‘foundationalist’- demonstrating that 
there are basic foundational ideas and concepts that structure our understanding of the world-, and 
‘anti-foundationalist’ in that the world is an ‘open system’ that is constantly emerging and 
developing and that the search for knowledge and understanding is never ending. In essence, the 
physical, biological and social worlds have orderly (modern), disorderly (postmodern) and complex 




Complexity has obvious implications for both naturalists and anti-naturalists (those who support and 
oppose the use of physical science theories and methods in the social sciences). Again, drawing on 
critical realism and the ‘non-positivist’ or ‘critical’ naturalism of Bhaskar (1979) and the works of 
Cilliers and Byrne, one can see that complexity acts as a bridge or link between the natural and social 
sciences. This desire to break down the barriers between the major fields of knowledge mirrors the 
conclusions of the famous Gulbenkian Commission (1996). This is not an attempt to impose a new 
unifying ‘scientific’ law on the social realm but a push to open up the sciences, ‘not only towards the 
world, but also internally. The barriers between the various scientific disciplines need to be crossed’ 
(Cilliers 1998, p. 127). In this sense, complexity theory is a direct challenge to strong naturalists and 
anti-naturalists who argue for the complete dominance or distinctiveness of one type of science over 
or from another, or who firmly reject the possibility of some types of generalisable scientific 
knowledge.  
 
In regards to policy, complexity is a rejection of the traditional modernist world view of order, 
causality, reductionism, predictability and determinism that marks the foundation of the more 
extreme versions of New Public Management (NPM) and Evidence-Based Policy Making (EBPM). It is, 
as Byrne and Callaghan argue, ‘a meta-theoretical position which remains within the modernist 
programme of progressive thought whilst at the same time rejecting the canons of reductionist 
positivism’ (Byrne and Callaghan  2013, p. 9). It is, ‘a way of thinking… which can help guide inquiries 
into the workings of complex social systems…but not to verify laws and law-like generalizations 
(Morçöl 2012, p. 266). From a Complexity perspective, the world can only be fully understood in 
terms of:  
• Partial Causality: phenomena can exhibit both orderly and chaotic behaviours, cause may 
not lead to effect –targets may improve a system, particularly basic ones, but direct causality 
will be uncertain. 
• Reductionism and Holism: some phenomena are reducible, others are not –at best, there are 
degrees of separation between targets, limiting their relevance and ability to evaluate them. 
• Predictability and Uncertainty: phenomena can be partially modelled, predicted and 
controlled –basic targets do matter, but so may minor ones that can have unpredictable 
‘butterfly effects’. 
• Probabilistic: there are general boundaries to most phenomena, but within these boundaries 
exact outcomes are uncertain –unknown long-term impact of all major targets and policies. 
• Emergence: policy systems exhibit elements of adaptation and emergence –targets create 
new strategies which create new targets and so on. 
• Interpretation: the actors in the system are aware of themselves, the system and their 
history and strive to interpret and direct themselves and the system –public opinion shapes 
targets and vice versa. (Geyer and Rihani 2010) 
 
These core elements have a range of expectations and implications for our understanding of 
governance and policy and policy making, and both academics and policy actors have been keen to 
explore them. Some of the key expectations and implications include:  
Expectations 
• Over time human knowledge increases, but physical, biological and human phenomena are 
unpredictable and evolve into new patterns within general boundaries. Policy actors can 
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know more, but the systems they are observing do not stand still, are unpredictable within 
general boundaries and are constantly evolving and reinterpreting themselves. 
• Knowledge is powerful and useful and more knowledge can be more powerful and more 
useful. However, due to the fundamentally unpredictable, probabilistic, emergent and 
interpretive nature of human existence, there is no way for policy actors to know the final 
order. Knowledge is always limited and learning never stops. 
• Greater knowledge does not guarantee greater prediction or control. Policy actors with 
greater knowledge must constantly recognise the limits of their knowledge and must act 
democratically rather than in an authoritarian fashion. 
• There are general boundaries to all phenomena, but a huge and evolving range of variation 
and emergence within those boundaries. There is no endpoint but a continual search for 
policy change within a bounded but emergent framework. 
• There is no fundamental hierarchy of knowledge or methods in policy studies. However, 




• Policy actors must take an open-minded and flexible approach to the orderly and disorderly 
foundations of all phenomena 
• There are continual bounded and emerging limits to human knowledge and public policy 
despite the exponential increase in evidence/data. 
• Policy actors can obtain some degree of predictive and experimental results but must often 
combine them with uncertainty and interpretation, at best probabilistic strategies.  
• Recognising the strengths and weaknesses of quantitative/qualitative methodological or 
evidence-based and interpretive strategies and balancing them against each other is the 
primary methodological strategy for supporting reasonable public policies. 
• Creation of an understanding of fundamental boundaries combined with an acceptance of 
continual discovery and openness is the ultimate goal. The key isn’t to find the final order 
and implement it, but encourage the actors in the policy area to adapt and adjust to the 
continual evolutionary changes. 
• At best, policy actors can pursue a continual balancing of probabilities in a bounded evolving 
situation. Enabling local actors to maximise their complexity within a stable framework 
creates the greatest likelihood for healthy evolution and adaptation. (Geyer and Rihani, 
2010). 
 
Challenges for Complexity and policy 
 
Unsurprisingly there have been a range of critics to the concept of ‘general’ complexity. For 
example, the very breadth of complexity implies that ‘The value of complexity exists in the eye of its 
beholder. For some it is merely a passing fad, for others an interesting complement to accepted 
conceptual frameworks, and for others it is a pioneering break from a moribund Newtonian 
worldview.’ (Manson 2001). At the same time as being accused of ‘being all things to all people’, in 
regards to policy analysis, despite the reality of day-to-day complexity in everyday life and the 
growing degree of complexity created by globalisation and the internet communications revolution, 
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the belief in a modernist vision of hierarchical state, business and social structures remains 
remarkably entrenched (Munro 2011). Complexity does provide the intellectual tools to undermine 
this perspective, but it is an uphill struggle. 
 
Moreover, it is a challenge to translate a meta-theoretical perspective into local action. Complexity 
does have implications at all levels of social organisation. Individuals, groups, nations and the global 
system can all be conceptualised in complexity terms. However, due to the fundamentally open and 
uncertain nature of complexity, detailed local direction is limited. Different complexity authors have 
identified a range of tools or toolkits (Room 2011; Stacey 2012). Others have focused on new 
modelling techniques (Geyer and Cairney 2015; Rosser 2009 for recent examples). Nevertheless, 
they do not provide detailed plans for local action nor a detailed strategy for future action. 
 
Finally, though complexity generates a range of policy expectations and implications it does not offer 
a clear moral or value framework for these expectations/implications. For example, from a 
complexity perspective basic human rights (rights to food, education, expression for example) are 
fundamental to the successful functioning of a complex society. These basic rights allow the ‘agents’ 
within the system to ‘satisfice’ their potential and increases the probability that the society will 
prosper under varying conditions (commonly found in generally open societies). However, what is 
the value of this outcome?  
 
Key premises for bringing pragmatism and complexity together 
 
From the reviews above, it is obvious that there is a substantial degree of overlap in the fields of 
pragmatism and complexity. These overlaps have been touched upon by a number of academics in 
different fields (Doll et al. 2005; Rescher 1998; Sanderson 2002, 2006 and 2009). Building on this and 
the work of Sanderson in particular, we argue that a framework of pragmatist complexity can be 
articulated around the following premises: 
 
1) Complexity theory is primarily a way of understanding the world, while pragmatism is 
primarily a perspective on how we do or should act in the world.   Nevertheless, they are 
complementary in that they arrive at similar attitudes about the importance and limits of 
knowledge in the face of complex social and natural environments. 
2) Not all policy problems are complex.  For some problems, goals may be well-defined and 
broadly agreed upon and the problems themselves may be stable, relatively independent of 
context and have tractable dimensions.  Such problems are more amenable to the technical 
rationality and positivist scientific techniques embraced by evidence-based policymaking.  
However, as problems become more complex, they become less amenable to these 
strategies.  It is useful to parse policy problems with respect to their complexity and to 
imagine more composite strategies to handle their different aspects. 
3) As policy problems become more complex, the knowledge of the problem becomes more 
partial and multiple perspectives on the problem proliferate; under these conditions, 
problem-solving must be more attentive to context and must mobilize and align different 
points of view and different types of knowledge with respect to that context. 
11 
 
4) As knowledge becomes more partial, it also becomes more fallible and provisional; 
knowledge claims should therefore be regarded as more heuristic than algorithmic and 
policymakers should treat knowledge as hypotheses subject to further refinement. 
5) As policy problems become more complex, it becomes less realistic to expect goals to be 
stable and well-ordered; instead, ends and means should be expected to continuously 
interact.   Under these conditions, assumptions of a technical model of rationality falter and 
an iterative and adaptive learning process is more suited to the challenge of emergent 
dynamics. 
6) An iterative and adaptive learning process treats problem-solving efforts as experiments and 
opportunities to learn; however, the implied conception of experimentation is broader than 
the model of controlled experimentation entailed by randomized controlled trials and 
includes trial and error, design experiments, etc. 
7) As the perspectives on a policy problem proliferate, actionable knowledge must be 
mobilized in conjunction with a reflexive and deliberative inquiry into the values at stake. 
8) The less that goals are well-formed and agreed upon and the more diverse the values, the 
more crucial it becomes to collaboratively define problems. 
9) As policy problems become more complex, (a) reflexive and deliberative inquiry into values, 
(b) collaborative definition of the problem, (c) strategies for mobilizing actionable 
knowledge; and an (d) iterative and adaptive learning process become different dimensions 
of the same problem-solving process. 
 
A brief case study: Drug policy 
 
Over the last decade or so, there have been strong calls in the UK and elsewhere for greater 
use of evidence in drug policy (Valentine 2009; Bennett and Holloway 2010; Monaghan 
2010).  Indeed, on October 30, 2014, MPs voted overwhelmingly (e.g., without division) for 
a proposal that the UK adopt a more evidence-based drugs policy (UK Parliament 2014). 
However, the limits of this EBPM strategy in drug policy have also become clearer over time.  
Evidence is definitely utilized in drug policymaking in the U.K. and in other countries (Ritter 
2009; Monaghan 2010; Strang et al. 2012; Tieberghien and Decorte 2013). However, 
evidence is often inconclusive (Stevens 2011; Monaghan 2012; Roberts 2014) or brandished 
selectively as a political strategy (Stevens 2011; Tieberghien and Decorte 2013). Drug policy 
is often politicized, placing limits on the use of scientific evidence (MacGregor 2013; 
Monaghan 2010, 2014; Roberts 2014). 
 
Drug policy is also complex, as described by Singleton and Rubin:  
 
Drug policy is a complex area beset by ideological divisions. It has both international 
and domestic dimensions, affects individuals and society in a wide variety of ways, 
and the many policy options for seeking to address drug-related challenges often 
evoke strong responses. There is widespread public concern about the control of 
drugs, their illicit supply and their use, and some drug use poses considerable public 
health risks for individuals, families and communities. Crime associated with illicit 
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drugs impacts internationally, nationally and locally…[D]rug policy is a quintessential 
multi-level and inter-departmental issue, requiring major contributions from health, 
criminal justice, education, welfare and foreign ministries (2014, p.936). 
 
A pragmatist complexity approach might begin by trying to parse this complexity, identifying 
areas or dimensions of the problem amenable to different approaches.   A Stacey diagram--
one of the most parsimonious and effective tools of complexity thinking for public policy 
and management—can be used to conceptualize this parsing process (Stacey 1993).  We 
modify the diagram here to reflect our earlier discussion.  On one dimension, we refer to 
well-ordered versus weakly-ordered goals. Well-ordered goals are clearly defined and 
widely accepted, while weakly-ordered goals may be poorly defined, highly contested, or 
both.  On the other dimension, we refer to tractable versus intractable problems.  When 
problems are tractable, they manifest themselves in a stable way over time, are relatively 
independent of context, and have a low dimensionality. By contrast, intractable problems 
are less stable, highly context-specific, and have a high dimensionality.   Following the logic 
of the Stacey diagram, we also suggest different zones that capture in a very approximate 
sense our analysis of the relationship between evidence and policymaking. 
 






In Zone I, goals are well-ordered and the problems are tractable.   This is the terrain where 
we expect evidence-based drug policy to have a greater chance of succeeding. This would 
include technical aspects such as the chemical compositions of psycho-active substances, 
the collection of data relating to aspects such as the number of drug related arrests, drug 
related hospital admissions/deaths, or the cost-benefit analysis of different types of drug 
treatment policies/interventions.  
 
If problems remain tractable but goals become less well ordered, we move into Zone II—
political decision-making.  Although gaining knowledge about the problem may be quite 
tractable, different stakeholders view the issue very differently (users vs. non-users, young 
vs. old, consumer vs. producer). Illegal drugs (as well as many legal ones) generate a huge 
amount of political disagreement and debate and touch upon core societal values. As 
Roberts summarises, ‘it is impossible to cleanse policy debates of values, even where these 
can be concealed more or less successfully for a while’ (Roberts 2014, p.953). In this zone, 
the varying types of political decision-making (electoral, representative and/or 
collaborative) are the best available strategies.  
 
Reciprocally, there may be a high level of agreement in Zone III (addiction/dependence is a 
problem or illegal drugs are often closely associated with criminal activity), but even the 
experts disagree significantly over how best to solve the problems. What treatments are 
best for differing types of addiction? What the best strategies for minimising criminal 
activity associated with drugs? In this Zone, experts weighing the probabilities of different 
pathways is the best that can be achieved.  Often, success in this zone requires delegating 
decision-making to professionals who exercise their best judgment and rely on case-by-case 
discretion.   This is the zone that Schön (1983) is primarily describing in his exploration of 
the design thinking of professionals. 
 
Zone IV is the zone of complexity and is arguably the most common one in the field of drug 
policy.  This is a situation where value conflicts interact with problem intractability to deeply 
challenge an authoritative evidence-based policy making logic, while also complicating 
straightforward political negotiation or professional judgment. It is in this zone where the 
logic of pragmatic complexity must come to the fore.  
 
A number of authors have offered suggested courses of action on drug policy that are 
compatible with the pragmatist complexity ideas laid out in the previous section. Valentine 
argues that a value-based policy can counteract the narrowing of evidentiary standards 
implied by EBPM: “A political-pragmatic ‘community values’ approach would assess the 
relative claims of different stakeholders (methadone clients, service providers, neighbours 
and business-people who want nothing to do with drug treatment) and make decisions 
based on the relative weights of each of these” (2009, p.460).  This approach mirrors the 
pragmatist complexity call for collaborative value inquiry.  Roberts (2014) argues that drug 
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policy is characterized by various kinds of potential evidence, which is rarely definitive and 
notes that experts are more likely to disagree as the issue becomes more important.   No 
amount of science, he argues, can escape the fact that drug policymaking is fundamentally 
about values.   He argues that a consultative process to bring together different kinds of 
knowledge and values together.   
 
Several scholars have also examined the basic framing of the drug problem and commented 
on how the construction of the problem is itself problematic.   Macgregor notes that the 
narrative “Drugs are dangerous” is deeply connected to the “disreputable poor” and that 
this narrative creates a strong barrier to the use of evidence, which is reinforced by a 
sensationalist media; consequently, politicians are incentivized to compete in taking a hard 
line and politicians and experts critical of the hard line against drugs are silenced. Lancaster 
(2014) develops a social constructivist approach to drug policy that encourages reflexivity 
about how problems are constructed.  She argues that this approach shifts the focus from 
problem-solving to problem-questioning and to an appreciation that policy knowledge must 
be oriented around the “…context, discourse, practices and participants within the policy 
process” (2014, p.950).  Lancaster and Ritter (2014) and Lenton (2004) describe successful 
collaborative processes for drug policymaking in Australia, suggesting that such processes 
have potential for reflexive and deliberative problem definition. 
 
Beyond drug policy, we can also draw some concrete strategies that might be called upon to 
flesh out a pragmatist complexity approach to drug policy.  In a study of health inequalities, 
for example, Cacari-Stone et al. describe a model for community-based participatory 
research that engages “…partners through the research process, from problem definition, 
through data collection and analysis, to dissemination and use of findings to help effect 
change” (2014, p.1615).  
 
Finally, Zone V is the area of extreme uncertainty and disagreement. Here is where evidence 
and expert advice is very limited and highly contested. For example, the treatment of drug 
addicts who have a range of health problems (including mental health issues), living in 
impoverished communities, and experiencing high levels of dependence is highly 
problematic. Trying to have a positive impact on their chaotic lives is like, ‘walking through a 
maze whose walls rearrange themselves with every step you take’ (Gleick 1987, p.24). We 
call this zone “ad hoc coping and intuition” to indicate the difficulty of systematically 
engaging a body of knowledge to address drug problems. Incrementalism is often the best 
approach, though one never knows which small step may lead to catastrophe. In these 
cases, experiential knowledge and intuition may be the best that one can achieve. 
 




Fundamentally, complexity theory reflects the growing economic, social and political 
complexity and uncertainty that we see in our everyday lives and is reflected in the shift 
from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ in the core political science/policy literature. The 
problem with complexity is that it lacks a normative framework. Basically, so long as a 
system maintains core boundaries, is relatively stable and open and encourages a wide 
variety of interactions, a plethora of particular structures and systems are possible. Detailed 
practical interventions and/or normative choices are uncertain. Hence, policy makers and 
societal actors have a right to say ‘what is the use of complexity?’ At the same time, society 
(amplified by the mass media and willing political actors) continues to try to reassert a more 
causal/modernist policy position. Someone must be in control and in democracies this 
should be our democratic representatives (and the bureaucratic machinery of 
national/regional/local policy that it is supposed to control). This implies a limited view of 
democracy where: 
The trend in political life is to insist on controlling responsibility by tightening the 
external standards of accountability. Yet the real problem of our public life is the 
failure of responsibility, not accountability. Increasing demands for accountability 
often obscure actual responsibility and enhance the gap between responsibility and 
accountability (Ansell 2011, p. 134). 
Similar to complexity, pragmatism is based on an engaged view of democracy and society 
that does not know or propose a final societal outcome but knows that the best way 
forward is through an open, educated, democratic society engaged in continual learning and 
dialogue with itself (free expression, debate, speech and interaction) and its governmental 
structures. It is the philosophy of ‘evolutionary learning’ and ‘democratic experimentalism’ 
(Ansell 2011, p. 5). In essence, complexity provides the meta-theoretical position, linking the 
natural and human societies, while pragmatism provides the justification and framework for 
societal/public action in a complex and uncertain world. Pragmatic complexity is based on a 
reasonably optimistic vision of human rationality and a belief in the ability of well-
intentioned individuals and societies to progress, in a generally positive direction, through 
discussion, learning, experimentation, debate and interaction. We believe this is both an 
accurate description of the policy world and a normative framework that promotes the 
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